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Wage-hedonics is used to recover the value of a statistical life by exploiting the fact that workers choosing
riskier occupations will be compensated with a higher wage.  However, Roy (1951) suggests that observed
wage distributions will be distorted if individuals select into jobs according to idiosyncratic returns.
We illustrate how this type of sorting may bias wage-hedonic VSL estimates and describe two estimators
that correct for it.  Using data from the CPS, we recover VSL estimates that are three to four times
larger than those based on the traditional techniques, statistically significant, and robust to a wide array
of specifications.
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Cost-benefit analyses of environmental, workplace, and product safety regulations 
frequently require estimates of the monetary value of fatality risk reductions.  This value 
typically comes in the form of the value of a statistical life (or, alternatively, the value of 
a statistical death averted) and is often estimated with wage-hedonic methods.
1  Workers 
are compensated for choosing to work in risky jobs.  However, workers vary in their 
idiosyncratic skills and the return to these skills may vary greatly across occupations.  In 
this paper we show that worker sorting based on idiosyncratic returns can bias value of 
statistical  life  (VSL)  estimates  derived  with  the  wage-hedonic  technique,  and  we 
demonstrate two new empirical strategies to correct for this source of bias.  In particular, 
we employ techniques introduced by Bayer, Khan, and Timmins (2007) to control for 
polychotomous selection when individuals care about more than just pecuniary returns.  
These  techniques  extend  the  idea  originally  posited  in  the  Roy  model  (1951),  which 
explains occupational sorting as a function of only wages.  The extension is appropriate 
for wage-hedonics since, in those models, workers sort across occupations based on non-
pecuniary job attributes like fatality risk in addition to their wages.
2 
Correcting for this bias is both empirically important and has significant policy 
implications.  For example, we estimate the VSL for men aged 18-60 to be roughly three 
                                                 
1 The value of a statistical life (VSL) is constructed from individuals’ revealed or stated willingness to 
trade-off other consumption for a marginal reduction in fatality risk (e.g., risk of on-the-job fatality in the 
context of wage-hedonics).  Suppose, for example, that an individual is willing to pay $40 for a policy that 
results in a 1-in-100,000 reduction in the chance of dying.  If we were to take 100,000 individuals 
confronted with this choice, the policy would lead to one fewer death among them.  Although none of those 
individuals know which of them will be saved by the policy, their aggregate willingness to pay is 40 x 
$100,000 = $4 million.  This number is taken as the VSL.  If asked for a willingness to pay to avoid his or 
her own particular death, any one individual would not be able to give a credible answer to the willingness-
to-pay question. 
2 The estimation strategies described below also have applications in other empirical contexts – for 
example, individuals migrating across cities, where utility is determined by both the wages and local 
amenities.   2 
to four times larger (and statistically significant) when we correct for “Roy sorting” than 
the VSL estimated on the same data but with traditional techniques.  We find this bias, 
moreover, in age-specific VSLs that exhibit patterns similar to those found by previous 
researchers.    Our  estimates  of  VSLs  for  women  are  reasonable  in  magnitude  and 
statistically  significant,  unlike  their  counterparts  based  on  traditional  wage-hedonic 
techniques.    These  larger  estimates  of  the  VSL  (which  are  also  less  sensitive  to 
specification) suggest a greater willingness among Americans to pay for reductions in 
fatality  risk  through  environmental,  workplace,  and  product  safety  regulations  than 
previously believed.   
This paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 describes the Roy model and explains 
why we should expect sorting based on idiosyncratic returns to yield biased estimates of 
the VSL calculated with traditional wage-hedonic techniques.  Section 3 discusses how 
our estimators deal with (or fail to address) some other well-known problems with the 
wage-hedonic approach.  Section 4 describes the data we use to implement our estimators, 
including  information  about  individual  workers  from  the  CPS,  data  describing 
occupational fatalities from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and data on other occupational 
attributes from the Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles.  Section 5 
outlines our first estimation strategy, which semi-parametrically identifies workers’ risk 
preferences in the presence of Roy sorting.  Section 6 reports the  results of our first 
estimator  alongside  results  derived  from  a  traditional  wage-hedonic  procedure,  and 
discusses the results of a number of alternative model specifications.  Section 7 describes 
and  implements  our  second  estimation  strategy,  which  makes  use  of  stronger   3 
independence  and  distributional  assumptions  but  requires  less  of  the  data.    Section  8 
discusses policy implications and concludes. 
 
2.  ROY SORTING BIAS IN THE WAGE-HEDONIC ESTIMATE OF THE VSL 
Rosen (1986) refers to the theory of equalizing differences as the “fundamental 
(long-run)  market  equilibrium  construct  in  labor  economics.”    It  explains  how  the 
difference in wages between risky and safe jobs is determined – if some jobs are less safe 
than others, the market equalizing difference (or “compensating differential”) is set so 
that enough workers sort into the risky occupation to clear the market.  This was the idea 
behind Thaler and Rosen’s (1975) seminal research on using labor market outcomes to 
value life – i.e., wage-hedonics. 
A  second  literature  in  labor  economics  has  examined  the  implications  of 
idiosyncratic differences in the returns to workers’ abilities for their choice of occupation.  
These implications were first demonstrated by Roy (1951), whose name has since been 
associated with this class of sorting models.  The idea behind the Roy model can be 
illustrated in a simple example.  In an economy with just two occupations, workers who 
choose  occupation  #1  over  occupation  #2  receive  greater  pecuniary  returns  from  this 
choice  than  those  workers  who  choose  occupation  #2  would  have  received  had  they 
chosen occupation #1, ceteris paribus.  The difference between the wages received by 
workers in occupation #1 and occupation #2 will not, therefore, reflect the difference 
between the wages that the average worker would have received in each sector.  In the 
simplest  possible  case,  this  type  of  sorting  does  not  create  a  problem  for  measuring 
compensating wage differentials.  However, with only minor complications, it can have   4 
important implications for the ability of wage-hedonics to recover the value of any job 
attributes  (including  fatality  risk).    We  demonstrate  why  with  a  series  of  numerical 
examples.
3 
Suppose that the wage individual i would receive from working in each of two 
occupations is determined by the following wage equation: 
 
(1)  j i j j i R w , , ε β + =   j = 1, 2 
 
where  the  idiosyncratic  component  of  the  wage  is  drawn  from  a  bivariate  normal 
distribution. 
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Let Rj measure the fatality risk in occupation j.  Occupation #1 is assumed to be “safe” 
(R1 = 0), whereas occupation #2 is “risky” (R2 = 1).  For the sake of simplicity, we set the 
coefficient on risk in the wage equation (β) to be 1.  Figure 1 illustrates the unconditional 
distribution of wages in each occupation.  The compensating wage differential ($1) is 
apparent in the difference between the means of these two distributions. 
The  distributions  portrayed  in  Figure  1  are  not,  however,  the  distributions  of 
wages once workers choose their preferred occupation (the conditional wage distribution).  
Individuals sort across occupations to maximize utility, which is determined in this simple 
                                                 
3 For a formal description of these features of the Roy model, see Heckman and Honoré (1990).   5 
example by wages in combination with fatality risk.  Individual i receives the following 
utility from choosing to work in occupation j: 
 
(3)  j j i j i R w U β − = , ,  
 
In the case described in equations (1) and (2), the average wage in occupation #2 will still 
be higher than that in occupation #1 by $1 to compensate for its added risk, even after 
individuals have optimally sorted.  Figure 2 demonstrates this result.  We construct Figure 
2 by simulating a pair of wages for each of one million individuals and assigning that 
individual  to  the  occupation  that  gives  her  the  highest  utility.    We  then  plot  the 
conditional wage distribution for each occupation (i.e., conditional upon workers having 
optimally sorted into that sector).  Note that, consistent with the predictions of the Roy 
model,  the  means  of  both  distributions  increase  while  their  variances  decrease.  
Importantly, the difference in the means of the two conditional distributions (1.57-0.57 = 
1.00) still reflects the true compensating wage differential from which we could derive an 
unbiased measure of the value of a statistical life.  This is because that difference is 
deducted  from  utility  before  Roy  sorting  occurs  and  is  therefore  not  distorted  by  the 
sorting process. 
  Now consider a minor modification of the sorting model in equations (1) and (2).  
In particular, suppose the variance of the unconditional wage distribution in occupation 
#1 (i.e., the “safe” occupation) is greater than that in occupation #2. 
   6 
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Figure 3 shows that the difference in the means of the unconditional wage distributions 
still reveals the true compensating wage differential.  However, when individuals sort, 
occupation #1 offers greater opportunities for very high wage draws (large idiosyncratic 
returns).  Optimal sorting yields a bigger upward shift in the mean of the occupation #1 
conditional wage distribution.  Comparing the means of the two conditional distributions 
in Figure 4 reveals  a downward bias in the  estimate of the  compensating differential 
(1.46-0.92 = 0.54), implying an understated VSL. 
  This sorting-induced bias is compounded if individuals’ wage draws are positively 
correlated across occupations.  Consider an extreme case: 
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Now,  the  individuals  receiving  the  highest  draws  in  occupation  #1  tend  to  be  those 
individuals who would have received a draw from the upper tail of the occupation #2 
wage distribution.  Those left in occupation #2 tend to be those individuals who receive 
low  draws  in  both  occupations.    Figure  5  illustrates  that  this  further  compresses  the 
difference in the means of the conditional wage distributions (i.e., down to 1.07-0.80 = 
0.27), making the sorting-induced downward bias in the implied VSL even more severe.  
The opposite is true if wage draws are negatively correlated across occupations: 
   7 
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although in this example, the negative correlation is not strong enough to offset the initial 
sorting bias.  Figure 6 illustrates this case, in which the compensating differential only 
falls to 1.69-1.06 = 0.63. 
 
2.1   Recovering the VSL in the Presence of Roy Sorting 
In these numerical examples, the direction and size of the bias induced by Roy 
sorting  depends  upon  the  relative  sizes  of  the  variances  of  the  unconditional  wage 
distributions  in  combination  with  the  correlation  of  individuals’  wage  draws  across 
occupations.
4    Heckman  and  Honoré  (1990),  however,  prove  that  these  unconditional 
distributions cannot be recovered without first assuming a value for the correlation in 
individuals’  wage  draws  across  occupations  (e.g.,  independence).    This  leaves  the 
researcher in a difficult position with respect to the bias in the wage-hedonic estimate of 
the VSL induced by Roy sorting – one needs to first assume a degree of correlation in 
wage draws in order to recover the unconditional wage distributions, but the degree of 
correlation itself affects the size of the bias induced by Roy sorting.  In Section 5, we 
demonstrate how one can avoid this problem and correct the sorting bias in the VSL (i) 
without knowing the unconditional wage distributions and (ii) without assuming anything 
about  the  correlation  in  individuals’  wage  draws  across  occupations.    This  procedure 
                                                 
4 In particular, by making the variance in occupation #2 larger than that in occupation #1, we could have 
made the bias in the VSL go in the opposite direction.   8 
yields  an  estimate  of  the  VSL  that  is  three  times  larger  than  that  derived  from  the 
traditional wage-hedonic technique. 
While  straightforward,  that  estimator  does  require  a  lot  from  the  data  –  in 
particular, estimates of the minimum order statistics associated with each of a number of 
conditional  wage  distributions.    While  the  quality  of  the  wage  data  we  use  in  our 
empirical application is quite high, we concede that measurement error and outliers can 
make it difficult to accurately estimate the minimum order statistic.  We subsequently 
offer a second estimation strategy in section 7 that requires far less of the data.  Instead of 
focusing on the minimum order statistic, it uses information from the entire conditional 
wage distribution, but requires an assumption of independent wage draws across sectors.  
That procedure recovers an estimate of the VSL that is more than four times the size of 
that derived from the comparable wage-hedonic regression.  We take the results of these 
two models as convincing evidence that Roy sorting matters, and leave it to the reader to 
determine which method is more appropriate for any particular application. 
 
3.  OTHER PROBLEMS WITH THE WAGE-HEDONIC ESTIMATE OF THE VSL 
The wage-hedonic technique has been used extensively (and has been rigorously 
scrutinized)  for  decades.    We  present  only  a  brief  overview  of  the  resulting  large 
literature.  Viscusi and Aldy (2003) provide a  comprehensive discussion of the VSL, 
paying particular attention to the wage-hedonic technique and the problems that can arise 
in  its  implementation.    Consider,  for  example,  the  role  of  unobservable  individual 
heterogeneity.  One particular form of such heterogeneity is worker productivity.  Hwang 
et al (1992) demonstrate that if workers can be classified as high or low productivity (i.e.,   9 
if there is positive correlation in wage draws across occupations) and if high productivity 
workers choose to take some of their compensation in the form of lower fatality risk, 
wages in low-risk occupations will look too high and the estimated fatality risk premium 
will  be  too  low.    This  problem  has  been  addressed  in  earlier  work  by  the  use  of 
longitudinal data, identifying individual fixed effects with either (i) workers who switch 
jobs or (ii) time-varying fatality rates within a job. [See, for example, Brown (1980), 
Black and Kneisner (2003), and Kniesner et al (2006)]  The first estimation approach we 
describe below will, conveniently, account for this source of bias in that (i) it assumes 
workers  take  account  of  both  wages  and  job  attributes  (including  fatality  risk)  when 
choosing an occupation, and (ii) it is robust to any form of correlation in workers’ wage 
draws (i.e., workers can have differing productivities).  Like the previous literature, our 
second estimator requires longitudinal data to address this issue. 
A separate problem arises if there is unobservable heterogeneity in individuals’ 
ability to avoid risk.  Shogren and Stamland (2002) note that estimates of the VSL will be 
biased  upward  if  there  is  heterogeneity  in  unobservable  safety-related  skills.    The 
presence of safety-related skills means that not all workers face the same risk on the same 
job – alternatively, some workers may simply be better at avoiding accidents than others.  
The compensating differential is determined by the marginal worker, who will have the 
least amount of safety-related skill among workers in the risky job and thus will face the 
highest risk.  If the average risk faced by workers in the risky job is instead used to 
calculate the estimate of the VSL, that estimate will be biased upward.  Our estimators, in 
their current form, are unable to allow for idiosyncratic exposure to risk.   10 
A third problem arises when individuals have heterogeneous preferences for risk.  
In particular, workers who put less value on safety are more likely to sort into risky jobs, 
biasing downward wage-hedonic estimates of the compensating risk premium.  While 
panel data and individual fixed effects provide one solution to this sort of preference-
based  sorting,  researchers  have  also  used  information  about  seatbelt  use  [Hersch  and 
Viscusi (1990), Hersch and Pickton (1995)] or smoking behavior [Viscusi and Hersch 
(2001)] to control for risk preferences.  While we do not employ data of this sort, our 
estimation approaches do permit distaste for fatality risk to be controlled for with these 
sorts of observable characteristics.
5 
There are a number of other problems that may arise when using wage-hedonics to 
measure the VSL.  For example, wage-hedonic techniques often ignore quality of life 
impacts, as well as the effects of life expectancy.
6  They usually measure the disutility of 
facing a particular kind of death that is neither slow nor protracted, and which does not 
involve a significant latency period.  These techniques may not, therefore, be good for 
valuing avoided deaths from cancer. [Savage (1993), Revesz (1999)]  Scotten and Taylor 
(2007) demonstrate that one should not even treat different sources of on-the-job fatality 
risk (e.g., accidental, transportation related, and death from violent assault) homogenously 
in  a  wage-hedonic  equation.    Because  they  focus  on  labor  market  outcomes,  wage-
hedonic techniques are not useful for valuing the lives of children and the elderly.  For 
these and other problems, there are a variety of alternative techniques for calculating 
                                                 
5 DeLeire and Levy (2004) provide empirical support for the notion that workers who, based on their 
observable characteristics such as sex, marital status, and whether they have children, likely have a greater 
distaste for dangerous work tend to choose safer occupations.   
6 Notable exceptions include Viscusi and Aldy (2006), who find that VSLs follow an inverted-U pattern in 
age, and Alberini et al (2004), who find lower VSLs for those over the age of 70 using stated preference 
techniques.  Other researchers have also found that the VSL declines at higher ages – see Table 10 in 
Viscusi and Aldy (2003) for a summary.  In contrast, Smith et al (2004) find no evidence of lower VSLs for 
older individuals.   11 
VSLs including stated preference, human capital approaches, and quantifying the risk 
tradeoffs agents make in non-labor market settings.
7  Finally, it is unclear how well actual 
on-the-job fatality risks proxy for the risks a worker perceives when he decides to accept 
or reject a wage offer. 
Even with all these problems, wage-hedonics remains prevalent in policy making.  
The EPA has recently reduced the VSL it uses for policy analysis to $7.22 million from 
$8.04 million.  This reduction will have important implications for which policies pass 
EPA cost-benefit analysis.  Both numbers are based on meta-analyses of a variety of VSL 
studies, many of which used wage-hedonic techniques.   
 
4.  DATA 
We use data from three different sources for both of our estimation strategies.  
First, we use data on hourly wage rates and occupations from the Outgoing Rotation 
Groups of the Current Population Surveys (CPS).  Second, we use data on fatal and non-
fatal risks associated with each occupation that we construct by merging Bureau of Labor 
Statistics  data  on  injuries  and  deaths  with  CPS  data  in  a  procedure  described  below.  
Third,  we  use  data  on  the  occupational  characteristics  (besides  injury  risks)  from  the 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). 
                                                 
7 Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004), for example, use states’ decisions to raise speed limits as evidence 
that the median voter was willing to incur an increased risk of driver death in exchange for lower travel 
times.  Atkinson and Halvorsen (1990), Dreyfus and Viscusi (1995), and Li (2006) look at the willingness 
of automobile buyers to trade-off risk of death with operating expenditures and purchase price.  Blomquist 
(1979) and Hakes and Viscusi (2007) use drivers’ decisions to employ seatbelts in order to recover 
estimates of the VSL, and Carlin and Sandy (1991) do so with data on individuals’ decisions to use child 
safety seats.  Portney (1981) and Gayer, Hamilton, and Viscusi (2000) use tradeoffs between housing 
expenditures and mortality from air pollution and cancer (caused by proximity to Superfund sites), 
respectively.   12 
We  record  wages  and  occupations  from  the  CPS  Outgoing  Rotation  Groups 
Surveys from 1983 through 2002. We restrict the data to these years because 1983 and 
2002 are the first and last years that the 1980 occupational classification was used in the 
CPS.  In particular, to determine occupation we use responses to the question “What kind 
of  work  was  …  doing  [last  week]?”  Our  sample  includes  all  individuals  who  were 
employed during the survey week.  This yields data on 3,434,820 workers.  
We assign fatal and non-fatal injury risks to each occupation using data from the 
BLS Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses and the Census of Fatal Occupational 
Injuries.  These data provide counts of injuries and fatalities at the 3-digit occupation 
level from 1992 to 1999; there is also information on the severity of non-fatal injuries, 
including the median number of days missed from work per injury within an occupation.
8 
In some cases the data are aggregated across 3-digit occupations; we aggregate all data to 
correspond to the 2-digit detailed occupation recodes in the CPS.
9  We use monthly CPS 
data to calculate hours worked over this period in each category to transform the counts 
into  risks  (the  number  of  injuries  per  100  full-time  workers).
10    We  also  calculate 
“anticipated” days of work lost due to nonfatal injury by multiplying the risk of nonfatal 
injury by the median days lost per injury within an occupation.  We then average over the 
period  1992-1999  in  order  to  minimize  the  effects  of  year-to-year  noise  (as  we 
demonstrate below, we do not need time variation in fatality risk for identification, even 
without assuming independence).  Average annual risk of death on the job is 0.005 for all 
                                                 
8 Note that simply being able to miss days from work after a non-fatal injury may be a positive amenity 
associated with many jobs. 
9 The categories do not correspond perfectly to the Census detailed occupation recodes; we collapse codes 
40, 41, and 42 into a single category since the fatality data are not available for these categories in a way 
that can be disaggregated. 
10 A full-time worker is assumed to work 2,000 hours/year, so that the risks we calculate are per 200,000 
hours worked.   13 
men (or one for every 25,000 men) and 0.002 for all women (or one for every 50,000 
women).   
We  also  use  data  on  other  job  attributes  from  the  Dictionary  of  Occupational 
Titles.  The DOT is a reference manual compiled by the U.S. Department of Labor that 
provides  information  about  occupations.    It  attempts  both  to  define  occupations  in  a 
uniform way across industries and to assess the characteristics of occupations.  While the 
occupational  characteristics  in  the  DOT  were  not  collected  from  a  nationally 
representative survey of firms and little detail on sampling or response rates is available, 
they are the best data available on the characteristics of occupations. The analysis of 
occupational characteristics was conducted through on-site observation and interviews 
with employees.  The DOT data were constructed by analysts assigning numerical codes 
to 43 job traits. We create six aggregate variables from the underlying DOT variables to 
describe  occupational  characteristics:  substantive  complexity,  motor  skills,  physical 
demands, working conditions, creative skills, and interactions with people.  A detailed list 
of the variables used to construct these data is provided in Table 1.  Table 2 summarizes 
the attributes of each occupation.  The highest risk occupations (in order) are (1) forestry 
and fishing, (2) motor vehicle operations, (3) other transportation occupations, (4) farm 
workers, and (5) construction, freight, labor.  All other occupations average fewer than 
one death per 10,000 workers each year.   
The  data  used  to  construct  hourly  wage  rates  for  our  analyses  come  from  the 
Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Groups files from 
1983 through 2002.  Wages are inflated to 2005 dollars using the CPI-U-RS.  Workers’ 
hourly wage rates are either (i) the reported hourly wage (for the 60 percent of workers   14 
paid on that basis) or (ii) weekly earnings divided by weekly hours (for the other 40 
percent of workers).
11  To avoid measurement error from using wages derived from salary 
and “usual” hours data, we drop the latter group of workers for our primary analysis.
12  
The focus of our investigation is therefore on “hourly” workers.  This group has received 
much of the attention in previous VSL studies. [Viscusi and Aldy (2003)] 
Table 3 summarizes the data describing hourly workers.  In particular, the table 
reports means for attributes of men and women, broken down according to whether the 
individual works in a high or low risk occupation.
13  There are a few interesting points 
that can be made simply by looking at these raw data.  Men in high risk occupations earn 
more on average than those in low risk occupations, even though the latter are more likely 
to be college educated.  This suggests the sort of variation in the data that would yield a 
positive VSL.  Men in high risk occupations are, however, also more likely to be older, 
married, union members, fulltime workers, and white – all of which are factors that would 
likely contribute to their being paid a higher wage.  This highlights the importance of 
controlling for individual heterogeneity when applying our estimators.  We describe how 
this is done in the following section. 
Unlike their male counterparts, women in high risk occupations tend to earn lower 
wages.  Like men, women with any college training are less likely to work in those jobs.  
Across most other attributes, women are similar irrespective of whether they work in a 
                                                 
11 Imputed data on wage rates were used to describe some hourly workers.  In cases where individuals do 
not provide complete responses to the Census Bureau interviewers, the Census Bureau imputes the missing 
data using the information provided by a different respondent with some of the same characteristics, when 
those characteristics were likely to be associated with the missing data.  
12 In Section 6.2, we do report a separate set of results for salaried workers. 
13 The individual is considered to be in a high risk occupation if that occupation has fatality risk above the 
median risk across all 43 occupations (i.e., 1.571 deaths per 100,000 workers each year).   15 
high or low risk occupation.  Finally, note that 83% of men work in occupations classified 
as high risk, while only 35% of women do so. 
 
5.  ESTIMATION STRATEGY 1: IDENTIFICATION 
We begin by describing our identification strategy with a simple model of sorting 
by individuals into one of two occupations (j = 1, 2).  We indicate the wage earned by 
individual i should he choose to work in occupation #1 or #2 as ωi,1 and ωi,2, respectively.  
In contrast to the classic Roy model, where sorting across occupations is driven entirely 
by an individual’s pecuniary compensation, we model sorting as determined by his wage 
draw  in  each  occupation  and  by  non-wage  determinants  of  utility  specific  to  each 
particular occupation.  We summarize the latter (for now) as “tastes”.  The conventional 
wisdom is that there is no additional information in conditional wage distributions with 
which to identify these taste parameters.  In the following model, we show how they are, 
in fact, identified with the help of a simple assumption. 
We begin by modeling individual i’s utility from choosing occupation j as the sum 
of wages (ωi,j) and tastes (τj): 
 
(7)  j j i j i U τ ω + = , ,  
 
The first important restriction we impose on the model is that there is no idiosyncratic 
component  to  the  taste  parameter  (i.e.,  we  estimate  τj  instead  of  τi,j).
14    After  first 
                                                 
14 By estimating this model separately for different types of individuals, it is possible to allow the taste to 
vary with observable individual attributes.  However, allowing tastes to vary with unobservable individual 
attributes does not appear to be possible without relying on strict distributional assumptions.  Our goal is to 
demonstrate how identification can be achieved without resorting to such distributional assumptions.   16 
explaining how to recover estimates of these taste parameters, we describe how they can 
be  used  to  recover  the  value  workers  place  on  particular  non-pecuniary  occupation 
attributes (e.g., fatality risk). 
Without loss of generality, we normalize τ1 = 0.
15  At this point, the goal of our 
exercise is to recover an estimate of τ2.
16  The difficulty in doing so arises from the fact 
that we only see (i) wage distributions conditional upon optimal sorting behavior, and (ii) 
an indicator of which occupation an individual chooses.  In particular, for an individual i, 
we only observe ωi,2 if: 
 
(8)  1 , 2 2 , i i ω τ ω ≥ +  
 
Alternatively, we only observe ωi,1 if: 
 
(9)  1 , 2 2 , i i ω τ ω < +  
 
Denote the smallest wage (i.e., the minimum order statistic, or extreme quantile) that we 
observe  from  someone  choosing  occupation  #1  or  #2  by  1 w   and  2 w ,  respectively.  
Assuming that the unconditional distributions of ω1 and ω2 have finite lower points of 
supports (denoted by 
*
1 ω  and 
*
2 ω ), we know the smallest value of ω1 that we could ever 
see, given that individuals maximize utility: 
                                                 
15 As in all random-utility frameworks, utility is only identified up to an additive constant.  This requires 
some sort of a normalization, which we use to eliminate one of the τ’s from the two-occupation example.  In 
the more general N occupation case, we estimate (N-1) distinct τ’s. 
16 Bayer, Khan, and Timmins (2007) describe how non-parametric estimates of the unconditional wage 
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We are not able to tell whether case A or B prevails in the data without first recovering an 
estimate of τ2, which is the object of the estimation procedure.  Conveniently, we are able 
to recover an estimate of τ2 in either case.
17  In particular: 
 
(13)  2 1 2 w w − = τ     
 
Equation  (13)  therefore  describes  our  minimum  order  statistic  estimator  for  τ2  in  the 
simplest two-occupation case.   Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the intuition underlying this 
                                                 
17 By exploiting information contained in the extreme tails of the wage distribution, this approach has much 
in common with the “identification at infinity” strategy for estimating treatment effects under selection 
described in Heckman (1990).   18 
estimator  for  cases  A  and  B,  respectively.    The  heavy  dashed  lines  in  each  figure 
correspond  to  the  minimum  order  statistics  that  would  be  observed  in  the  data  (i.e., 
*
1 1 ω = w  and  2
*
1 2 τ ω − = w  in case A, and  2
*
2 1 τ ω + = w  and 
*
2 2 ω = w  in case B).  In each 
case, the difference between the heavy dashed lines identifies τ2. 
  We reiterate at this point that, at no point in the preceding discussion were we 
required to say anything about the relative sizes of the variances of wage draws across 
occupations  or  the  correlation  in  an  individual’s  wage  draws  across  occupations.  
Correlations  that  are  positive,  negative,  or  zero  are  all  consistent  with  this  model.  
Identification  relies  only  on  differences  in  the  supports  of  different  conditional  wage 
distributions. 
The theory used to describe the simple two-occupation case scales-up naturally to 
any  number  of  potential  occupations.    With  more  than  two  potential  occupations, 
however, we require some additional notation.  Consider the following three-occupation 
system with wages for individual i denoted by ω1,i, ω2,i, and ω3,i.  We denote the lower 
supports  of  each  occupation’s  wage  distribution  by 
*
1 ω , 
*
2 ω ,  and 
*
3 ω .    We  therefore 
normalize τ1 = 0.  For individual i, we observe wi, where: 
 
(14) 
)] , ( max [
)] , ( max [
)] , ( max [
2 , 2 , 1 3 , 3 , 3
3 , 3 , 1 2 , 2 , 2
3 , 3 2 , 2 , 1 , 1
τ ω ω τ ω ω
τ ω ω τ ω ω
τ ω τ ω ω ω
+ > +
+ + > +
+ + + > =
i i i i
i i i i






We also observe an indicator corresponding to which occupation individual i has selected 
– i.e., d1,i, d2,i, and d3,i.  We note that, under convex supports for all random variables and   19 
assuming finite lower support points (
*
1 ω , 
*
2 ω , 
*
3 ω ), we have the following conditional 
minimum order statistics: 
 






1 , 1 1 τ ω τ ω ω + + = = = i i d w w  






1 , 2 2 ) , , ( max ) 1 | ( min τ τ ω τ ω ω − + + = = = i i d w w  






1 , 3 3 ) , , ( max ) 1 | ( min τ τ ω τ ω ω − + + = = = i i d w w  
 
Notice that τ3 is equal to  ) ( 3 1 w w − , while τ2 is equal to  ) ( 2 1 w w − . 
  With estimates of τ for multiple occupations j = 1, 2, …, it becomes possible to 
decompose  the  taste  parameter  into  the  utility  effects  of  multiple  non-pecuniary 
occupation  characteristics,  X  (including  fatality  risk),  along  with  an  unobserved 
occupation attribute, εj, by way of regression analysis.
18 
 
(16)  j j j X ε β τ + ′ =  
 
6.  ESTIMATION STRATEGY 1: RESULTS 
  In this section, we describe the results of two sets of estimation procedures.  The 
first is based on the traditional wage-hedonic model for recovering marginal willingness-
to-pay for reductions in fatality risk.  In particular, we estimate a regression of the form: 
                                                 
18 This assumes, of course, that E[εX] = 0, which may be violated if there are important omitted job 
characteristics.  In our application, we deal with this concern directly by employing the best available data 
describing occupation attributes.  Alternatively, if one believed that correlated unobservable job attributes 
were time invariant, and if one could exploit time variation in fatality risk, it would be possible to estimate 
multiple taste parameters (i.e., a different vector for each time period), pool them over time, and include 
occupation fixed effects in equation (16) to deal with the endogeneity.  See, for example, the data used by 
Costa and Kahn (2004) in their analysis of changes in the VSL from 1940-1980.   20 
 
(17)  j i j j i j i X FATAL Z w , 3 2 1 0 , ε α α α α + ′ + + ′ + =  
 
where i indexes workers and j indexes forty-three occupation categories.
19  Z is a vector 
of variables describing worker i including: 
 
HSDROP      worker is a high-school dropout 
HSGRAD      worker is a high-school graduate 
SOMECOLL      worker has completed < 4 years of college 
COLLGRAD      worker has a four year college degree 
AGE        age measured in years 
AGE2       age-squared 
MARRIED      worker is married and lives with spouse 
UNION      worker is a union member 
MSA        worker lives in a metropolitan area 
FULLTIME      fulltime worker (i.e., hours > 35 per week) 
PUBLIC      worker is in the public sector 
BLACK      worker is African-American 
OTHER      worker is other race (non-white) 
HISPANIC      worker is of Hispanic decent 
NEW ENGLAND    worker lives in New England census region 
MID-ATLANTIC     worker lives in Mid-Atlantic census region 
EAST NORTH CENTRAL  worker lives in East North Central census region 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL  worker lives in West North Central census region 
SOUTH ATLANTIC   worker lives in South Atlantic census region 
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL  worker lives in East South Central census region 
WEST SOUTH CENTRAL  worker lives in West South Central census region 
MOUNTAIN      worker lives in Mountain census region 
PACIFIC      worker lives in Pacific census region 
 




                                                 
19 We also estimated a set of traditional wage-hedonic specifications using the natural log of hourly wages 
as the dependent variable.  These specifications yield a statistically significant and positive relationship 
between fatal risk and male wages and a statistically significant, but negative relationship between fatal risk 
and female wages.   21 
NONFATAL  “Anticipated” days of work lost due to nonfatal injury. 
 
SCMPLX  Substantive complexity, including complexity of function in 
relation to data, general educational development, intelligence, 
numerical aptitude, adaptability to performing repetitive work, 
sensor or judgmental criteria, specific vocational preparation, and 
verbal aptitude. 
 
MSKILL  Motor skills, including color discrimination, finger dexterity, 
manual dexterity, motor coordination, and complexity in relation to 
things. 
 
PHYDDS  Physical demands, including climbing and balancing, eye-hand-
foot coordination, dealing with hazardous conditions or outside 
working conditions, stooping, kneeling, crouching, or crawling. 
 
WORCON  Working conditions, including extreme cold, extreme heat, 
wetness, or humidity. 
 
CSKILL  Creative skills, including abstract and creative activities, feelings, 
ideas, or facts. 
 
INTPEOPLE  Worker interactions with people. 
 
 
The main variable of interest is the fatality risk associated with occupation j, represented 
by FATAL (the number of deaths per 100 full-time workers) which we defined above. 
   Recognizing that the value placed on certain job attributes may differ with worker 
attributes, we also estimate a regression of the form: 
 
(18)  j i AGE j coll j j j i j i d X d X X FATAL Z w , 5 40 4 3 2 1 0 , ) ( ) ( ε α α α α α α + ′ + ′ + ′ + + ′ + = >  
 
where dcoll is a dummy variable indicating that SOMECOLL = 1 or COLLGRAD = 1, and 
dAGE>40 is a dummy variable indicating that the individual is over 40 years of age.  At this 
stage of the analysis, we restrict our estimate of the compensating differential in wages 
(and, hence, the VSL) to be constant across worker attributes.   22 
  We then take the estimate of the marginal willingness-to-pay to avoid fatality risk, 
α2, and scale this up by a typical number of hours worked in a year (2,000) and by the 
number of workers over whom the annual fatality risk was measured (100).  This provides 
us with our estimated VSL. 
  Table 4a describes the results of regression equations (17) and (18) for both men 
and women where the dependent variable is the hourly wage.  Table 4b describes the 
corresponding results where the dependent variable is the log hourly wage.  In each case, 
we  estimate  two  specifications  –  one  in  which  we  use  worker-occupation  attribute 
interactions, and another in which we do not.  All results reported in this section of the 
paper are based on a trimmed sample that drops all individuals reporting wages lower 
than the federally mandated minimum wage in the year of observation.
20, 
21 95 percent 
confidence  intervals,  which  were  calculated  allowing  for  clustering  at  the  occupation 
level, were computed using an M/N bootstrap method.   
 
6.1.  Minimum Order Statistic Estimator 
  We carry-out a comparable set of specifications of our minimum order statistic 
estimator.  The practical difficulty in applying this estimator in the current context arises 
in controlling for the rich set of worker attributes provided by the CPS.  One alternative is 
to divide the data up into very small groups and apply the estimator non-parametrically to 
each group.  An advantage of doing so would be that we would be able to estimate taste 
                                                 
20 In many years, CPS wages are top-coded at a nominal value of $99.99.  We drop all observations 
nominally at or above this top-coded value in every year.  Dropping observations with wages below the 
federally mandated minimum wage reduces the influence of mismeasured wages, particularly in the lower 
tail of the wage distribution.  Results without lower trimming are reported in the sub-section 6.2. 
21 Keep in mind that, in the traditional wage-hedonic model, a disamenity enters the wage equation 
positively, indicating a positive wage differential paid to compensate for the unattractive job attribute.   23 
parameters  that  vary  with  observable  individual  attributes.    The  problem  that  arises, 
however, is that for a particular group (e.g., black, non-Hispanic, married men aged 18-30 
with  a  high-school  education,  living  in  an  MSA  in  New  England,  who  are  fulltime 
workers but not in the public sector), we may be unlikely to see many individuals in a 
particular occupation (e.g., machine operators).  The estimator becomes very sensitive to 
the wages of the few individuals we do see, and fails if we see no workers in a group.  
Alternatively, we could choose not to control for individual attributes at all, but then we 
would be deriving our measure of the VSL from the wages and occupation choices of a 
potentially unrepresentative group.  We therefore adopt a two-stage estimation procedure 
that introduces some parametric modeling.
22  We first estimate a regression of the form: 
 
(19)  j i i j i u Z w , 1 0 , ˆ + ′ + = β β  
 
where  j i w , ˆ  is individual i’s observed wage in occupation j, having differenced out the 
mean of all wages earned by workers in occupation j.  ξi,j measures worker i’s wage in 
occupation j, purged of the effects of observable individual attributes Zi:
23 
 
(20)  1 0 , , β β ξ i j i j i Z w ′ − − =  
 
                                                 
22 This two-step approach is similar to that employed by Bajari and Kahn (2005), who face a similar 
problem of needing to perform non-parametric estimation with an abundance of covariates. 
23 Note that we use wi,j, not  j i w , ˆ , in deriving ξi,j.  ξi,j should be purged of the effects of observable individual 
attributes, but not of the level-effects attributable to being in different occupations.      24 
We then use ξi,j as our “wage” in implementing the lower bound estimator.  This allows 
us to compare different individuals without having to divide them into unreasonably small 
sub-groups.
24 
  In  particular,  normalizing  the  taste  parameter  for  a  large  occupation  (i.e., 
occupation  #34  –  construction  trades)  to  be  zero,  we  recover  estimates  of  the  taste 
parameters for the remaining sectors according to the formula:  
 
(21) 
j j ξ ξ τ − =
34  
 
and  carry  out  the  second-stage  regression  to  recover  the  value  of  non-pecuniary  job 
attributes: 
 
(22)  j j j j X FATAL υ β β θ τ + ′ + + = 3 2  
 
where θ accounts for the arbitrary choice of normalization in deriving the τ’s.  In a final 
specification, we also include interactions between Xj and dcoll and between Xj and dAGE>40 
in the estimation of equation (19). 
  We rely on M/N bootstrapping techniques to recover confidence intervals.
25  In 
particular, we conduct 1000 M/N bootstrap simulations of each specification, from which 
                                                 
24 This assumption does impose the constraint that job attributes and worker characteristics enter additively 
in determining a worker’s wage.  This is restrictive, but not significantly different from the assumption 
usually maintained in the VSL literature.  We have also estimated specifications that relax this assumption 
as well as specifications that allow the effect of worker characteristics to vary by occupation.  These 
specifications, available upon request, yield minimum order statistics that are very similar to those obtained 
from the specification presented in this paper. 
25 Inference is complicated by the fact that the lower bound estimator does not have an asymptotically 
normal distribution.  The traditional bootstrap algorithm, moreover, is invalid when the estimate is not   25 
we  derive  symmetric  95%  confidence  intervals.
26    Results  are  consistent  with 
expectations  –  workers  exhibit  a  strong  and  statistically  significant  disutility  from 
increased fatality risk.
27 
  One  might  reasonably  be  concerned  with  the  effect  of  measurement  error  and 
outliers on the performance of this estimator.  Put simply, if the differences between 
minimum  order  statistics  are  driven  by  outliers  or  mismeasured  data,  this  will  filter 
through the model and drive our point estimate of the marginal utility associated with 
each job attribute.  We take comfort, however, from the fact that our estimates are nearly 
always statistically significant.  If our estimates were, in fact, being driven by outliers or 
many forms of measurement error, we would expect this to be reflected in large standard 
errors calculated by our bootstrap procedure.
28 
  Tables 5 and 6 report the results of our minimum-order-statistic estimator, for both 
men and women.  The first and third columns refer to the specification that does not 
include worker-occupation attribute interactions; the second and fourth columns include 
these interactions.  Tables 5a and 5b report results where the dependent variable was the 
hourly wage while Tables 6a and 6b report results where the dependent variable was the 
log hourly wage.  Tables 5a and 6a reports results for equation (19), while Tables 5b and 
                                                                                                                                                  
asymptotically normal.  This problem is overcome by the use of the M/N bootstrap, a variant on sub-
sampling (here, we use bootstrapped sub-samples that are ¼ the size of the full data set).  While yielding 
inefficient (i.e., overly large) estimates of the confidence interval, the M/N bootstrap does produce 
confidence interval estimates that are consistent. 
26 Specifically, a bootstrap simulation consists of taking a random ¼ sub-sample (drawn with replacement) 
from the population of ξi,j’s.  We then determine the values of τj, j = 1, 2,…, 43, and regress these values on 
the vector of occupation attributes.  We record the resulting estimates and repeat the entire process 1000 
times.   The bootstrapped confidence interval is then found by taking the 2.5
th and 97.5
th percentiles of the 
distribution of bootstrapped parameter estimates. 
27 In contrast to the traditional wage-hedonic model, we are here estimating structural utility function 
parameters.  Disutility is therefore indicated by a negative parameter value.  Recall, moreover, that these 
parameter estimates are already normalized by the marginal utility of wages, so that they can be interpreted 
as marginal willingnesses-to-pay, and are comparable across sub-populations. 
28 That is, any particular M/N sample would be unlikely to contain the problematic observation, producing a 
very different point estimate.   26 
6b  reports  the  results  of  equation  (22).    Also  reported  are  95%  confidence  intervals 
derived from the M/N bootstrap. 
  Table 7a summarizes the VSL estimates from both the traditional wage hedonic 
and minimum order statistic estimation techniques for each of the specifications described 
above  when  the  dependent  variable  wage  the  hourly  wage.    Looking  only  at  point 
estimates for men, the minimum order statistic estimator produces VSL estimates that are 
2.7 and 4.3 times greater than those produced by the traditional wage hedonic procedure.  
The minimum order statistic estimates are, moreover, statistically significant with a 95% 
confidence interval ranging from approximately $5 million to almost $16 million. 
  For women, the difference between the two models is even starker.  The minimum 
order statistic estimator yields results that are similar to those for men – $7.95 or $11.76 
million, depending upon whether worker-occupation attribute interactions are included in 
the  first-stage  estimation.    Moreover,  these  results  are  statistically  significant.    By 
contrast, the wage-hedonic procedure yields negative VSL point estimates for women.  In 
all  cases,  we  can  reject  the  hypothesis  that  the  VSLs  estimated  by  traditional  wage-
hedonic methods are equal to those estimated from minimum order statistics. 
The log-wage hedonic specification (see Table 7b) yields estimates of the VSL for 
men that are even lower (approximately $1.02 to $1.75 million) and yields estimates of 
the VSL for women that are also negative (approximately -$8.59 million).  The minimum 
order statistic estimates of the VSL are larger for men (between $9 and $10 million) and 
positive for women (between $3.7 and $7.5 million). Again, we can reject the hypothesis 
that the VSLs estimated by traditional wage-hedonic methods are equal to those estimated 
from minimum order statistics.   27 
6.2  Alternative Specifications 
  Because our estimator is based on the minimum order statistic, it is possible that 
our results may be sensitive to the particular choice of model specification (including the 
criteria used to draw a data sample).  In this sub-section, we explore that sensitivity with a 
variety of alternative specifications.  Tables 8a and 8b report the VSL estimates arising 
from twelve alternatives.  We note at the outset that in these subsamples, the traditional 
wage-hedonic procedure typically does not produce a statistically significant estimate, 
and for women, most of the point-estimates have the wrong sign.  Table 8a reports the 
results from the hourly wage specifications while Table 8b reports the results from the log 
hourly wage specifications.  The first row of Table 8a reports estimates based on the 
sample of salaried workers.  Minimum order statistic estimates remain significant, but fall 
relative to their values for wage workers (more so for men than for women).  Wage-
hedonic  estimates,  on  the  other  hand,  rise  dramatically  but  have  large  confidence 
intervals.  The second row reports results based on a sample of hourly workers that does 
not  drop  those  reporting  wages  below  the  federally  mandated  minimum.    These  low 
wages  may  be  real  observations,  but  might  also  simply  reflect  measurement  error.  
Including these low wages has the effect of collapsing across-occupation variation at the 
bottom of the wage distribution, with the effect of reducing the VSL estimate based on 
the  minimum  order  statistic.    Even  with  this  reduction,  however,  the  estimate  is  still 
statistically  significant  and  larger  than  that  based  on  the  traditional  wage  hedonic 
technique.   28 
  The  next  four  rows  describe  results  based  on  samples  drawn  to  include  only 
individuals in a certain age range.
29,30  In particular, we perform the exact same estimation 
procedure described in the previous sub-section (including estimating parameters on AGE 
and AGE2), but do so only on a sub-set of workers (e.g., aged 20 to 29).  It is reassuring 
that the same inverted-U pattern found in previous work is apparent in our results.  The 
inverted-U is, moreover, shifted upward for the minimum order statistic estimates relative 
to the wage-hedonic estimates. 
  The next two rows describe how the VSL varies with marital status.  Using the 
minimum order statistic estimator, we find that married men have a higher VSL.  This 
difference goes away when considering women, and is not present for men or women 
when using the traditional wage-hedonic estimator. 
  The next two rows describe how the VSL estimates vary with the time period of 
analysis.  If we restrict our data to the 1983 to 1992 period, we obtain larger estimates for 
men of the VSL based on minimum order statistics while if we restrict the data to the 
1993 to 2002 period, we get smaller estimates for men.  For women, the estimates of the 
VSL based on minimum order statistics are, by contrast, larger in the latter period. 
The final two rows of Tables 8a and 8b illustrate two cases in which our model 
may not perform well.  In the first, we restrict ourselves to using a limited set of worker 
attributes (AGE, AGE2, HSDROP, SOMECOLL, COLLGRAD).  This has the effect of 
reducing the variability across occupations in the lower bound of our wage distributions.
31  
                                                 
29 In these results (and in the remainder of the results in this section), we use the trimmed sample of hourly 
workers as a starting point. 
30 Besides age, researchers have also calculated VSLs that differ with respect to race [Viscusi (2003)], 
income, and union status [summarized in Viscusi and Aldy (2003)]. 
31 Consider an extreme example.  When we trim all observations below the federally mandated minimum 
wage and use no covariates, it will likely be the case that there is no variation at all across sectors in the   29 
The result is to provide a sort of lower bound on the VSL estimate.  While the minimum 
order  statistic  estimate  falls  below  that  found  with  the  wage-hedonic  model,  it  does 
remain statistically significant.  This result highlights the importance of explaining as 
much of the variation in wages as possible with observable worker attributes. 
  The final row illustrates the effects of having little cross-occupation variation in 
fatality risk.  In particular, we eliminate the relatively risky occupation categories #41 - 
#43 (i.e., farm managers, farm workers, and forestry & fishing).  The result is to increase 
the confidence intervals for the estimates derived from both techniques (particularly for 
the minimum order statistic estimator).  The change has little effect on the point estimate 
for  men  based  on  the  wage-hedonic  technique,  but  the  point  estimate  based  on  the 
minimum order statistic jumps dramatically. 
 
7.  ESTIMATION STRATEGY 2  
  While  the  CPS  provides  high-quality  data  on  wages,  one  might  generally  be 
concerned  about  the  potential  for  measurement  error  or  outliers  to  prevent  us  from 
accurately measuring the true minimum order statistic.  A similar concern might arise in 
settings where one has a relatively small sample to work with.  In this section, we employ 
an alternative estimation strategy that instead uses data from the entire conditional wage 
distribution and makes no assumption about the distributions’ supports. [Bayer, Khan, 
and Timmins (2007)]  Instead, it relies upon two alternative identifying assumptions: (i) 
                                                                                                                                                  
lower point of support.  The VSL recovered with our minimum order statistic estimator would therefore be 
$0.   30 
the unconditional distribution of log-wage in occupation j is normal with mean  j µ  and 
variance 
2
j σ , and (ii) wage draws for individual i are independent across occupations.
32 
To explain this estimator, we return to the simple model of individuals sorting 
over  two  occupations,  indexed  by  #1  and  #2.    Without  loss  of  generality,  we  again 
normalize the taste for occupation #1 to zero (τ1 = 0).  We define a variable di, which 
functions as an indicator that individual i chose occupation #1: 
 
(23)  ] [ 2 , 2 , 1 τ ω ω + > = i i i I d  
 
Using this indicator, we can write down an expression for individual i’s observed wage: 
 
(24)  i i i i i d d w , 2 , 1 ) 1 ( ω ω − + =  
 
i.e., the individual receives his draw from occupation #1 if it was utility maximizing to 
choose that occupation.  Next, define the following joint probability distributions, both of 
which are easily observed in the data: 
 
(25)  ) , 0 ( ) ( ) , 1 ( ) ( 2 1 t w d P t t w d P t i i i i ≤ = = Ψ ≤ = = Ψ  
 
We will also work with the derivatives of these expressions, denoted by: 
                                                 
32 This same assumption underlies the traditional wage-hedonic model estimated with cross-sectional data 
(with panel data, individual fixed effects have been used to control for unobserved worker productivity).  
With panel data, we could relax the independence assumption in our model as well, as we could include 
individual fixed effects amongst the individual characteristics in the estimation of equation (19).   31 
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Focusing  on  the  expression  for  Ψ1(t),  we  exploit  the  assumption  that  wage  draws 
(conditional on observable individual attributes) are independent across sectors to re-write 
it as follows: 
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This means that we can define ψ1(t) as: 
 











An analogous argument defines ψ2(t): 
 










   32 
Going back to the final integral in equation (27) and carrying out integration-by-parts 
yields: 
 
(30)  ∫ ∫
∞ − ∞ −
− − − = − = Ψ
t t
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Performing a change of variables  2 τ − = s u , equation (30) becomes: 
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Next, we use the expressions for ψ1(t) and ψ2(t) defined in (28) and (29) to re-write 
equation (31) as follows: 
 






















Noting  that  the  integral  term  in  (32)  is  simply  ) ( 2 2 τ − Ψ t ,  we  can  solve  for  the 
distribution of ω1 as a function of τ2: 
 
(33) 



















   33 
where λ1(t) is a function of the unconditional wage distribution in location #1.  (33) is a 
single equation in two unknowns (λ1(t) and τ2) when evaluated at a particular value of t, 
and it is therefore not surprising that we cannot identify both of these values without 
making  an  additional  assumption.    Bayer,  Khan,  and  Timmins  (2007)  show  how  the 
equation can be estimated without parametric assumptions in a model of spatial sorting by 
assuming that workers living in the same location receive a wage draw from the same 
distribution irrespective of where they migrated from.  That source of variation is not 
available in the data used to recover the VSL.  Instead, we make a parametric assumption 
about  F1(t).    Assuming  F1(t)  is  the  cumulative  normal  distribution  with  mean  µ1  and 
variance σ1
2 would reduce equation (33) to three parameters.  The number of parameters 
does not increase, moreover, as we consider the expression evaluated at different values 
of t.  By forcing the equation to hold for many values of t, we therefore have more 
equations than unknowns and can easily identify the model’s parameters. 
The preceding arguments scale-up to any number of occupations (although the 
denominator in the right-hand-side expression of (33) becomes more complicated).  We 
can,  therefore,  estimate  the  model  in  our  occupational  sorting  context  by  forming  a 
minimum-distance  criterion  function  based  on  equation  (33).    In  our  application, 
minimizing  this  objective  function  requires  us  to  search  over  a  high-dimensional 
parameter  space  (i.e.,  forty-three  means,  forty-three  variances,  and  forty-two  taste 
parameters, which could then be regressed on job attributes as in equation (16)).
33  We 
make one further simplifying assumption in order to facilitate estimation – that the taste 
parameter can be written as a function of observable occupation attributes:  β τ j j X′ = .  
                                                 
33 In this unrestricted specification, one of the taste parameters must still be normalized to zero.   34 
We therefore need to only estimate eight β parameters instead of a separate τj for each 
occupation. 
Table 9 describes the outcome of this estimation procedure applied to the sample 
of male hourly workers earning more than the federal minimum wage.
34  We evaluate a 
minimum distance criterion function based on (33) at 200 values of log-wages evenly 
spaced between 0.25 and 4.25.
35  Standard errors are bootstrapped from 800 re-samples.  
Because we are modeling log-wages, the coefficient on fatality risk needs to be multiplied 
by the wage rate before being converted into a VSL.  We use the average wage rate in the 
sample ($13.16).  The result is a statistically significant VSL estimate of $8.05 million, 
which is smaller than that recovered by our first estimator, but more than four times larger 
than the comparable estimate from the wage-hedonic model in Table 7b (i.e., $1.756 
million). 
Although the assumptions and methodology used to arrive at this estimate differ 
dramatically  from  those  in  the  previous  section,  the  result  is  remarkably  similar.  
Controlling for Roy sorting, we recover a VSL that is three to four times greater than that 
derived  from  traditional  wage-hedonics.    Taken  together,  the  results  of  these  two 
methodological approaches lead us to conclude that the VSL based on traditional wage-




                                                 
34 Specifically, we apply the procedure to the “purged” wage data that were created by removing the 
variation in wages explained by observable worker attributes (i.e., ξi,j from equation (20)). 
35 Bayer, Khan, and Timmins (2007) describe the details of this procedure.  For example, we use normal 
density kernels and a Silverman’s rule of thumb to approximate ψ j t ( ) .  Ψ j t ( ) is measured non-
parametrically as a step-function.   35 
8.  CONCLUSIONS 
The  effect  of  individual  unobservable  heterogeneity  (i.e.,  productivity)  on 
estimates  of  the  value  of  a  statistical  life  has  been  addressed  in  previous  work,  but 
occupational (Roy) sorting based on idiosyncratic returns is absent from the literature on 
VSL.  We demonstrate that this type of sorting has the potential to bias wage-hedonic 
estimates  of  the  VSL.    Recovering  the  size  and  direction  of  that  bias  is  a  difficult 
empirical problem that depends partly upon the relative variances of the unconditional 
sector-specific wage distributions. 
We first demonstrate a way to deal with Roy sorting bias without recovering the 
unconditional  wage  distributions  and  without  relying  upon  distributional  assumptions.  
Doing so requires the relatively innocuous assumption that wage distributions have finite 
lower bounds.  In addition to controlling for the biases induced by Roy sorting, this non-
parametric estimator also corrects for biases resulting from unobserved productivity, of 
the sort described by Hwang et al  (1992).   It is, moreover,  easy to use – everything 
(except standard errors) can be calculated with a spreadsheet.  Finally, it can be expanded 
to use better data sets (e.g., a finer gradation of occupation/sector, like those used by 
Kniesner et al (2006) or Scotten and Taylor (2007).  In so doing, however, it does also 
require  the  strong  practical  assumption  that  we  can  accurately  measure  the  minimum 
order statistic associated with conditional wage distribution.  For some (small, noisy) data 
sets, this will clearly not be the case.  In response to this concern, we offer a second 
estimation strategy that does not impose strict data requirements but that does require an 
independence  assumption  on  wage  draws  when  using  cross-sectional  data.    The 
conclusions  of  both  models  are  that  traditional  wage-hedonic  techniques  yield   36 
significantly  downwardly  biased  estimates  of  the  VSL.    That  bias  is  big  enough, 
moreover, to matter for policy.  Estimates for men rise by a factor of three or more while 
estimates for women become positive and of similar magnitude as those for men.  These 
estimates  suggest  that  substantially  larger  valuations  should  be  used  in  cost-benefit 
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Table 1 
Determinants of Job Characteristics Based on DOT Data 
 
             
 
Factor 1  SUBSTANTIVECOMPLEXITY     
DATAL (complexity of function in relation to data)   
GED (general educational development)   
INTELL (intelligence)   
NUMERCL (numerical aptitude)   
REPCON (Adaptability to performing repetitive work)   
SJC (sensor or judgmental criteria)   
SVP (specific vocational preparation)   
VERBAL (verbal aptitude)   
 
Factor 2  MOTOR SKILLS     
CLRDISC (color discrimination)   
FNGRDXT (finger dexterity)   
MNLDXTY (manual dexterity)   
MTRCRD (motor coordination)   
THINGS (complexity in relation to things)   
 
Factor 3  PHYSICAL DEMANDS      
CLIMB (climbing, balancing)   
EYHNFTC (eye-hand-foot coordination)   
HAZARDS (hazardous conditions)   
OUT (outside working conditions)   
STOOP (stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling)   
 
Factor 4  WORKING CONDITION     
COLD (extreme cold)   
HEAT (extreme heat)   
WET (wet, humid)   
 
Factor 5  CREATIVE SKILLS     
ABSCREAT (abstract & creative activities)   




Factor 6  INTPEOPLE 
PEOPLE (interaction with people) 
 Table 2 (a) 
Occupation Attributes 
 
Occupation  FATAL  NONFATAL  SCMPLX  MSKILL  PHYDDS  WORCON  CSKILL  INTPEOPLE 
3-6: Pub. Admin.  0.0018  0.0000  0.6879  1.1353  -0.2425  0.6505  -0.1907  -0.2694 
7-22: Other Exec.  0.0020  1.4982  0.6143  1.1082  -0.4853  -0.3941  -0.1763  -0.3935 
23-37: Management  0.0009  1.3879  0.9138  1.1947  -0.7276  -0.4849  -0.1829  -0.2586 
44-59: Engineers  0.0023  1.0150  1.3207  -0.9070  -0.4879  -0.4232  0.4608  -1.3702 
64-68: Mathematical and Comp Sci  0.0004  0.6365  1.1708  1.3192  -0.6439  -0.5881  -0.0977  -0.2871 
69-83: Natural scientists  0.0023  0.8725  1.3793  -0.9374  -0.3347  0.3333  0.0038  -1.3461 
84-89: Health diagnosers  0.0011  1.8691  1.8017  -3.1622  -0.5097  -0.5521  -0.4203  -3.1264 
95-106: Health assess & treat  0.0007  5.1230  0.6012  -0.9513  -0.4469  -0.5923  -0.3494  -0.4050 
113-154: Professors  0.0005  0.2670  1.6046  1.4303  -0.8375  -0.5982  -0.1342  -0.8641 
155-159: Teachers (exc. coll.)  0.0005  1.2979  0.9016  0.3525  -0.3597  -0.5881  0.9809  -1.0559 
178-179: Lawyers & judges  0.0012  0.3306  2.0665  1.7181  -0.9118  -0.6018  4.1324  -1.6702 
43,63,163-177,183-199: Oth. prof. spec.  0.0011  2.2276  1.1812  0.1353  -0.5487  -0.0945  4.1225  -1.2298 
203-208: Health tech.  0.0009  8.6382  0.0277  -1.0334  -0.3174  -0.4868  -0.3592  -0.1885 
213-225: Eng/sci tech.  0.0020  4.2027  0.5435  -1.4970  -0.4499  -0.4413  -0.0645  -0.7843 
226-235: Tech, not eng/sci  0.0096  5.5567  0.7081  0.4057  -0.5408  -0.5718  -0.0134  -0.5043 
243: Sales supervisors  0.0033  3.5027  0.4089  1.0263  -0.2950  -0.3658  -0.0998  -0.2668 
253-257: Sales reps and business  0.0012  1.5427  0.6899  1.2582  -0.8207  -0.5888  -0.3644  0.2252 
258-259: Sales reps, non-retail comm.  0.0016  2.0476  0.2529  1.0859  -0.8616  -0.5615  -0.3929  0.3773 
263-278: Sales work, retail & svc.  0.0020  5.3078  -0.4732  -0.2793  -0.7061  -0.5062  -0.3788  0.4036 
283-285: Sales-related occupations  0.0000  5.8560  -0.0287  -0.0613  -0.8066  -0.5784  0.7758  0.2225 
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Table 2 (b) 
Occupation Attributes 
 
Occupation  FATAL  NONFATAL  SCMPLX  MSKILL  PHYDDS  WORCON  CSKILL  INTPEOPLE 
303-307: Admin. Supervisors  0.0004  2.6672  0.1349  0.3182  -0.6802  -0.4804  -0.3788  -0.1069 
308-309: Computer operators  0.0000  1.7641  -0.0650  -0.4041  -0.5568  -0.6022  -0.4023  -0.4457 
313-315: Secretaries  0.0003  2.0029  0.3957  -1.9561  -0.9030  -0.5939  -0.4176  -0.4713 
337-344: Fin. record process  0.0002  2.1631  -0.1916  -0.4688  -0.8965  -0.5598  -0.4209  0.1085 
354-357: Mail/msg dist.  0.0025  11.5449  -1.1516  0.5619  -0.6374  -0.4628  -0.4289  1.1268 
316-336,345-353,359-389: other admin.  0.0005  6.3292  -0.3962  0.5455  -0.7559  -0.4331  -0.3810  0.3642 
403-407: Pvt. hh service  0.0007  0.0000  -1.3641  0.7072  0.2214  -0.5826  -0.4251  1.4478 
413-427: Protective svc.  0.0086  7.7154  -0.6374  0.6563  0.7423  1.0386  -0.4224  0.7100 
433-444: Food service  0.0009  8.8127  -0.8628  0.4484  -0.3909  2.1472  -0.1096  0.6795 
445-447: Health service  0.0008  24.1017  -0.8532  -0.2811  0.6658  -0.3933  -0.3731  0.9321 
448-455: Cleaning/bldg svc.  0.0020  13.8845  -1.5140  0.3170  1.1338  -0.2767  -0.4196  1.4232 
456-469: Personal svc.  0.0014  9.1429  -0.4508  -0.5895  -0.2467  -0.4406  1.3130  0.3487 
503-549: Mechanics & repairers  0.0053  15.2240  -0.0444  -1.3110  0.7587  0.3971  -0.4063  -0.6087 
553-599: Construction trades  0.0068  22.5577  -0.0188  -0.9502  2.2933  -0.1960  -0.3797  -0.2826 
613-699: Other precision production  0.0029  13.6475  -0.5258  -1.0338  0.0501  1.6055  -0.3601  0.2105 
703-779: Machine operators  0.0024  22.6953  -1.2204  -0.3437  -0.1057  0.8997  -0.3738  0.9643 
783-799: Fabricators, inspectors  0.0028  17.8286  -1.2994  -0.4417  -0.0571  0.6781  -0.3785  1.2154 
803-814: Motor vehicle operators  0.0176  35.6393  -1.3383  -0.3606  0.7426  -0.4457  -0.4160  0.7532 
823-859: Other transportation  0.0166  29.2157  -1.1876  -0.0819  1.1613  0.4532  -0.4187  1.1319 
864-889: Construction, freight, labor  0.0110  34.9962  -1.6291  0.4910  1.0768  3.8833  -0.4244  1.7816 
473-476: Farm managers  0.0094  0.3968  0.4685  0.2723  2.3756  -0.4168  -0.4280  -1.0789 
477-489: Farm workers  0.0117  11.4986  -1.3619  0.3021  2.6532  -0.1571  -0.3915  1.5059 
494-499: Forestry & fishing  0.0872  35.0779  -1.2595  0.2617  2.6898  2.9723  -0.4088  1.0820   42 





                                                 
36 This table describes the sample of hourly wage workers, excluding all those who earn less than the federal minimum wage. 
  Men  Women 
  Low Risk  High Risk  Low Risk  High Risk 
Sample Size  107,140  519,970  412,307  281,131 
Wage  13.12  13.17  12.14  9.81 
AGE  31.82  34.03  35.77  35.38 
MARRIED  0.39  0.54  0.56  0.51 
UNION  1.97  1.96  1.97  1.98 
MSA  0.81  0.70  0.74  0.70 
FULLTIME  0.71  0.85  0.63  0.66 
WHITE  0.82  0.86  0.85  0.82 
HSDROP  0.13  0.22  0.08  0.20 
HSGRAD  0.27  0.45  0.38  0.46 
SOMECOLL  0.36  0.26  0.38  0.25 
COLLGRAD  0.24  0.07  0.17  0.08 
NEW ENGLAND  0.08  0.08  0.09  0.09 
MID ATLANTIC  0.12  0.11  0.13  0.11 
E. N. CENTRAL  0.14  0.14  0.16  0.15 
W. N. CENTRAL  0.10  0.10  0.12  0.10 
SOUTH ATLANTIC  0.16  0.19  0.16  0.19 
E. S. CENTRAL  0.04  0.06  0.05  0.07 
W. S. CENTRAL  0.08  0.10  0.08  0.09 
MOUNTAIN  0.12  0.10  0.09  0.09 
PACIFIC  0.16  0.12  0.12  0.11 Table 4a 
Wage-Hedonic Model Estimates 
Dependent variable: wage 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
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(0.657, 0.775) Table 4a (continued) 
Wage-Hedonic Model Estimates
37 
Dependent variable: wage 
 
Occupation Attributes  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
FATAL  24.531  14.128  -46.452  -24.612 
  (16.930 , 32.667)  (6.495 , 22.219)  (-58.770 , -33.982)  (-37.084 , -12.707) 
NONFATAL  0.098  -0.009  0.100  0.022 
  (0.093 , 0.104)  (-0.025 , 0.006)  (0.094 , 0.106)  (0.005 , 0.039) 
SCMPLX  5.679  -1.362  4.274  -1.200 
  (5.443 , 5.908)  (-2.098 , -0.642)  (4.088 , 4.457)  (-1.824 , -0.593) 
MSKILL  -1.447  -1.080  -0.388  -0.111 
  (-1.541 , -1.354)  (-1.372 , -0.784)  (-0.435 , -0.340)  (-0.270 , 0.048) 
PHYDDS  -0.413  0.655  0.734  -0.744 
  (-0.456 , -0.373)  (0.535 , 0.767)  (0.668 , 0.814)  (-0.988 , -0.534) 
WORCON  0.125  0.011  0.153  -0.087 
  (0.096 , 0.153)  (-0.075 , 0.098)  (0.124 , 0.182)  (-0.177 , -0.002) 
CSKILL  -0.346  -0.328  -0.805  -0.248 
  (-0.437 , -0.248)  (-0.650 , -0.007)  (-0.864 , -0.744)  (-0.441 , -0.034) 
INTPEOPLE  2.738  0.228  0.852  -0.228 
  (2.497 , 2.962)  (-0.465 , 0.919)  (0.610 , 1.069)  (-1.046 , 0.529) 
Constant  4.728  2.524  4.934  3.803 
  (4.192 , 5.328)  (1.997 , 3.148)  (4.391 , 5.477)  (3.224 , 4.375) 
Worker-Occupation Attribute Interactions  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Regional 
Indicators 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.3283  0.3502  0.3293  0.3513 
N  627110  627110  693438  693438 
 
 
                                                 
37 Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (in brackets) are clustered to reflect the fact that occupation attributes are the same for all workers in a particular 
occupation.   
 Table 4b 
Wage-Hedonic Model Estimates 
Dependent variable: log wage 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








Worker Attributes         
HSDROP  -0.118  -0.119  -0.089  -0.102 
  (-0.124, -0.113)  (-0.124, -0.114)  (-0.094, -0.083)  (-0.108, -0.097) 
SOMECOLL  0.019  0.048  0.083  0.089 
  (0.014, 0.024)  (0.038, 0.057)  (0.079, 0.087)  (0.079, 0.100) 
COLLGRAD  0.128  0.134  0.274  0.257 
  (0.120, 0.138)  (0.123, 0.146)  (0.267, 0.281)  (0.245, 0.269) 
AGE  0.048  0.051  0.037  0.038 
  (0.047, 0.049)  (0.049, 0.052)  (0.036, 0.038)  (0.037, 0.039) 
AGE2  -0.001  -0.001  0.000  0.000 
  (-0.001, 0.000)  (-0.001, -0.001)  (0.000, 0.000)  (0.000, 0.000) 
BLACK  -0.103  -0.100  -0.043  -0.044 
  (-0.110, -0.096)  (-0.108, -0.093)  (-0.049, -0.038)  (-0.049, -0.038) 
OTHER  -0.071  -0.067  -0.021  -0.021 
  (-0.083, -0.060)  (-0.078, -0.056)  (-0.032, -0.012)  (-0.031, -0.012) 
HISPANIC  -0.105  -0.106  -0.046  -0.047 
  (-0.111, -0.098)  (-0.112, -0.099)  (-0.052, -0.040)  (-0.054, -0.042) 
MARRIED  0.096  0.093  0.021  0.019 
  (0.091, 0.101)  (0.088, 0.098)  (0.017, 0.025)  (0.016, 0.023) 
PUBLIC  0.084  0.079  0.047  0.044 
  (0.077, 0.092)  (0.071, 0.087)  (0.040, 0.054)  (0.038, 0.051) 
UNION  -0.173  -0.172  -0.145  -0.142 
  (-0.184, -0.162)  (-0.184, -0.161)  (-0.158, -0.131)  (-0.155, -0.129) 
MSA  0.068  0.069  0.090  0.091 
  (0.064, 0.073)  (0.064, 0.073)  (0.085, 0.094)  (0.087, 0.095) 
FULLTIME  0.114  0.112  0.087  0.089 
  (0.109, 0.120)  (0.106, 0.118)  (0.083, 0.090)  (0.085, 0.093) 
 
  Table 4b (continued) 
Wage-Hedonic Model Estimates
38 
Dependent variable: log wage 
 
Occupation Attributes  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
FATAL  0.667  0.388  -2.280  -1.123 
  (0.190 , 1.194)  (-0.098 , 0.893)  (-3.103 , -1.486)  (-1.984 , -0.345) 
NONFATAL  0.008  0.004  0.009  0.006 
  (0.008 , 0.009)  (0.003 , 0.005)  (0.008 , 0.009)  (0.004 , 0.007) 
SCMPLX  0.372  0.166  0.312  0.064 
  (0.359 , 0.383)  (0.129 , 0.205)  (0.302 , 0.323)  (0.030 , 0.098) 
MSKILL  -0.110  -0.110  -0.029  -0.012 
  (-0.115 , -0.104)  (-0.127 , -0.093)  (-0.032 , -0.026)  (-0.022 , -0.001) 
PHYDDS  -0.027  0.030  0.041  -0.025 
  (-0.029 , -0.024)  (0.022 , 0.038)  (0.036 , 0.045)  (-0.040 , -0.010) 
WORCON  0.003  -0.007  0.004  -0.007 
  (0.001 , 0.005)  (-0.013 , -0.001)  (0.002 , 0.006)  (-0.014 , 0.000) 
CSKILL  -0.027  -0.038  -0.066  -0.047 
  (-0.031 , -0.022)  (-0.055 , -0.022)  (-0.070 , -0.063)  (-0.059 , -0.035) 
INTPEOPLE  0.176  0.148  0.049  0.005 
  (0.163 , 0.189)  (0.112 , 0.186)  (0.036 , 0.061)  (-0.040 , 0.049) 
Constant  1.724  1.630  1.743  1.688 
  (1.692 , 1.760)  (1.595 , 1.669)  (1.709 , 1.776)  (1.652 , 1.725) 
Worker-Occupation Attribute Interactions  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Regional 
Indicators 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.3944  0.4046  0.3977  0.4106 
N  627110  627110  693438  693438 
                                                 
38 Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (in brackets) are clustered to reflect the fact that occupation attributes are the same for all workers in a particular 
occupation.     47 
Table 5a 
Minimum Order Statistic Estimator, First Stage (Worker Attributes) 
Dependent variable: wage 
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 









Attribute  Interactions 
No  Yes  No  Yes 
Constant  -5.624  -6.006  -3.708  -4.144 
  (-5.737, -5.508)  (-6.121, -5.887)  (-3.802, -3.610)  (-4.240, -4.050) 
HSDROP  -1.203  -1.254  -0.553  -0.706 
  (-1.268, -1.140)  (-1.321, -1.191)  (-0.605, -0.496)  (-0.760, -0.649) 
SOMECOLL  0.058  0.203  0.181  0.388 
  (-0.004,  0.117)  (0.090, 0.309)  (0.131, 0.231)  (0.275, 0.486) 
COLLGRAD  1.312  1.873  2.075  2.529 
  (1.202, 1.437)  (1.724, 2.037)  (1.993, 2.160)  (2.403, 2.651) 
AGE  0.449  0.458  0.299  0.308 
  (0.430, 0.468)  (0.439, 0.478)  (0.289, 0.312)  (0.295, 0.321) 
AGE2  -0.004  -0.005  -0.003  -0.003 
  (-0.005, -0.004)  (-0.005, -0.004)  (-0.003, -0.003)  (-0.003, -0.003) 
BLACK  -1.007  -1.129  -0.194  -0.278 
  (-1.100, -0.921)  (-1.220, -1.041)  (-0.255, -0.127)  (-0.341, -0.207) 
OTHER  -0.760  -0.814  -0.088  -0.189 
  (-0.899, -0.603)  (-0.955, -0.659)  (-0.212, 0.024)  (-0.317, -0.074) 
HISPANIC  -1.184  -1.275  -0.456  -0.532 
  (-1.268, -1.100)  (-1.357, -1.190)  (-0.526, -0.381)  (-0.603, -0.457) 
MARRIED  0.884  0.958  0.039  0.097 
  (0.821, 0.949)  (0.892, 1.021)  (-0.006, 0.088)  (0.052, 0.145) 
PUBLIC  0.344  0.395  0.162  0.290 
  (0.231, 0.445)  (0.282, 0.505)  (0.086, 0.233)  (0.213, 0.362) 
UNION  -2.483  -2.461  -1.564  -1.549 
  (-2.651, -2.307)  (-2.628, -2.288)  (-1.741, -1.390)  (-1.731, -1.375) 
MSA  0.762  0.826  0.869  0.928 
  (0.698, 0.823)  (0.762, 0.887)  (0.824, 0.915)  (0.884, 0.974) 
FULLTIME  0.847  0.904  0.492  0.562 
  (0.766, 0.925)  (0.820, 0.984)  (0.448, 0.537)  (0.517, 0.607) 
Regional 
Indicators 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.1463  0.1530  0.0964  0.1037 
N  627110  627110  693438  693438   48 
Table 5b 
Minimum Order Statistic Estimator, Second Stage (Occupation Attributes)
39 
Dependent variable: wage 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








Constant  -2.203  -1.628  2.225  2.218 
  (-3.500, 0.374)  ( -3.042, 0.740)  (1.187, 2.764)  (1.213, 3.219) 
FATAL  -67.145  -59.978  -39.747  -58.782 
  (-82.070, -27.816)  (-81.406, -22.040)  (-65.413, -21.154)  (-71.257, -36.302) 
NONFATAL  0.073  0.033  0.008  0.002 
  (0.006, 0.093)  (-0.029, 0.063)  (-0.048, 0.034)  (-0.054, 0.026) 
SCMPLX  -0.794  -1.986  -0.839  -2.149 
  (-1.280, 0.860)  ( -2.281, 0.041)  (-1.214, 0.561)  (-2.448, -0.593) 
MSKILL  0.395  0.636  0.243  0.408 
  (-0.199, 0.602)  (-0.143, 0.763)  ( -0.438, 0.344)  (-0.304, 0.477) 
PHYDDS  0.109  0.336  -0.446  -0.408 
  ( -0.298, 0.469)  (-0.144, 0.725)  (-0.650, -0.059)  (-0.639, -0.036) 
WORCON  0.285  0.556  0.107  0.105 
  (-0.121, 0.614)  (0.175, 0.896)  ( -0.157, 0.368)  (-0.203, 0.353) 
CSKILL  -0.059  0.243  0.174  0.219 
  (-0.322, 0.294)  (-0.005, 0.670)  (-0.002, 0.536)  (0.050, 0.583) 
INTPEOPLE  -0.617  -1.247  -0.322  -0.942 
  ( -0.918, 1.376)  (-1.366, 1.145)  (-0.468, 1.327)  (-0.952, 0.920) 
 
                                                 
39 Confidence intervals (in brackets) are based on the 2.5
th and 97.5
th percentiles of the distribution of bootstrapped parameter estimates.    49 
Table 6a 
Minimum Order Statistic Estimator, First Stage (Worker Attributes) 




  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 









Attribute  Interactions 
No  Yes  No  Yes 
Constant  -0.530  -0.564  -0.344  -0.382 
  (-0.540, -0.521)  (-0.571, -0.556)  (-0.351, -0.337)  (-3.899, -3.874) 
HSDROP  -0.097  -0.103  -0.061  -0.075 
  (-0.101, -0.092)  (-0.107, -0.098)  (-0.065, -0.057)  (-0.080, -0.071) 
SOMECOLL  0.003  0.026  0.017  0.035 
  (-0.001,  0.007)  (0.018, 0.033)  (0.013, 0.020)  (0.026, 0.042) 
COLLGRAD  0.048  0.100  0.121  0.160 
  (0.042, 0.054)  (0.091, 0.109)  (0.116, 0.126)  (0.151, 0.168) 
AGE  0.038  0.039  0.026  0.027 
  (0.037, 0.040)  (0.038, 0.040)  (0.026, 0.027)  (0.026, 0.028) 
AGE2  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (-0.000, -0.000)  (-0.000, -0.000)  (-0.000, -0.000)  (-0.000, -0.000) 
BLACK  -0.076  -0.088  -0.019  -0.027 
  (-0.082, -0.070)  (-0.094, -0.081)  (-0.024, -0.014)  (-0.031, -0.022) 
OTHER  -0.049  -0.054  -0.007  -0.016 
  (-0.057, -0.040)  (-0.063, -0.046)  (-0.015, 0.000)  (-0.024, -0.009) 
HISPANIC  -0.087  -0.095  -0.040  -0.047 
  (-0.092, -0.081)  (-0.100, -0.090)  (-0.046, -0.035)  (-0.053, -0.042) 
MARRIED  0.068  0.075  0.008  0.013 
  (0.064, 0.072)  (0.071, 0.079)  (0.005, 0.011)  (0.010, 0.016) 
PUBLIC  0.030  0.032  0.020  0.031 
  (0.024, 0.036)  (0.026, 0.039)  (0.015, 0.025)  (0.026, 0.035) 
UNION  -0.168  -0.167  -0.126  -0.125 
  (-0.177, -0.158)  (-0.176, -0.157)  (-0.137, -0.114)  (-0.135, -0.113) 
MSA  0.060  0.065  0.077  0.082 
  (0.056, 0.064)  (0.061, 0.069)  (0.074, 0.080)  (0.079, 0.085) 
FULLTIME  0.096  0.101  0.065  0.072 
  (0.091, 0.101)  (0.096, 0.106)  (0.062, 0.068)  (0.069, 0.075) 
Regional 
Indicators 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.2018  0.2126  0.1385  0.1507 
N  627110  627110  693438  693438  
Table 6b 
Minimum Order Statistic Estimator, Second Stage (Occupation Attributes)
40 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 









Attribute  Interactions 
No  Yes  No  Yes 
Constant  -0.170  -0.130  0.166  0.162 
  ( -0.277, 0.006)  (-0.237, 0.050)  (0.072, 0.236)  (0.068, 0.290) 
FATAL  -3.980  -3.526  -1.649  -3.343 
  (-6.649, -1.637)  ( -6.858, -1.117)  (-6.751, -0.701)  ( -6.964, -1.627) 
NONFATAL  0.004  0.002  3.434E-04  -2.099E-04 
  (0.001, 0.008)  (-0.002, 0.005)  ( -0.004, 0.004)  (-0.005, 0.002) 
SCMPLX  -0.047  -0.129  -0.082  -0.183 
  ( -0.124, 0.063)  (-0.192, -0.003)  (-0.127, 0.032)  (-0.225, -0.050) 
MSKILL  0.006  0.023  0.012  0.026 
  ( -0.020, 0.049)  (-0.013, 0.062)  ( -.035, 0.035)  (-0.028, 0.045) 
PHYDDS  0.016  0.026  -0.037  -0.029 
  (-.0178, 0.045)  (-0.006, 0.058)  (-0.056, -0.010)  (-0.062, -0.004) 
WORCON  0.017  0.036  -0.005  -0.008 
  (-0.010, 0.041)  ( 0.011, 0.062)  (-0.019, 0.026)  (-0.025, 0.026) 
CSKILL  -0.015  0.021  0.027  0.033 
  (-0.022, 0.014)  ( -0.002, 0.048)  (-0.003, 0.054)  (0.007, 0.064) 
INTPEOPLE  -0.008  -0.037  -0.024  -0.065 




                                                 
40 Confidence intervals (in brackets) are based on the 2.5
th and 97.5
th percentiles of the distribution of bootstrapped parameter estimates.  
 
Table 7a:  Value of a Statistical Life ($ millions) 
95% Confidence Interval
41 





                                                 
41 Bootstrapped confidence intervals in brackets. 








Worker-Occupation Attribute Interactions  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Wage-Hedonic Model  4.906  2.826  -9.290  -4.922 
  (3.386 , 6.533)  (1.299 , 4.444)  (-11.754 , -6.796)  (-7.417 , -2.541) 
Minimum Order Statistic Estimator  13.429  11.996  7.949  11.756 
  (5.563, 16.414)  (4.408, 16.281)  (4.231, 13.083)  (7.260, 14.251) 
Difference between Wage-Hedonic and 
Minimum Order VSL estimates  -8.523  -9.170  -17.239  -16.678 
  (-11.224 , -0.324)  (-13.628 , -1.318)  (-23.003 , -12.522)  (-19.474 , -11.020) 
          
 
Table 7b:  Value of a Statistical Life ($ millions) 
95% Confidence Interval
42 
Dependent variable: log wage 
 
 
Wage-Hedonic Model  1.756  1.021  -5.105  -2.515 
  (0.500 , 3.138)  (-0.258 , 2.345)  (-6.950 , -3.321)  (-4.441 , -0.771) 
Minimum Order Statistic Estimator  10.476  9.282  3.692  7.486 
  (4.314, 17.524)  (2.942, 18.069)  (1.570, 15.062)  (3.644, 15.586) 
Difference between Wage-Hedonic and 
Minimum Order VSL estimates  -8.720  -8.261  -8.797  -10.001 
  (-15.669 , -2.482)  (-16.998 , -2.001)  (-19.815 , -6.231)  (-18.029 , -5.733) 
         
                                                 
42 Bootstrapped confidence intervals in brackets. 








Worker-Occupation Attribute Interactions  No  Yes  No  Yes  
Table 8a:  Sensitivity Analysis, Value of a Statistical Life ($ millions) 
95% Confidence Interval in Parentheses 
Dependent variable: wage 
 









Salaried Workers   4.617  7.983   0.047  42.746 
  (14.436, 0.473)  (-7.593, 23.559)   (21.902, -6.354)  (-5.071, 90.564) 
Un-trimmed Sample  16.401  5.488  7.321  -3.404 
  (23.745, 9.979)  (-7.571,  18.547)  (14.962, 4.598)  (-47.803, 40.995) 
Age [20,30)  7.173  3.013  7.614  -8.427 
  (10.511, 2.928)  (-6.082, 12.108)  (18.218, 3.820)  (-41.768, 24.915) 
Age [30, 40)  9.080  6.422  8.873  -4.719 
  (15.283, 5.079)  ( -6.181, 19.025)  (17.144, 5.468)  (-49.989, 40.551) 
Age [40, 50)  13.218  6.952  9.999  -11.040 
  (19.892, 4.999)  (-9.422, 23.326)  (28.204, 5.510)  (-61.749, 39.669) 
Age [50, 60)  7.328  2.660  3.713  -14.241 
  (18.251, 2.429)  ( -15.920, 21.241)  (35.953, -0.875)  (-68.023, 39.540) 
Married  13.633  4.871  7.165  -14.453 
  (18.658, 5.573)  ( -7.671, 17.413)  (15.690, 3.843)  (-61.768, 32.861) 
Unmarried  7.182  4.899  8.494  -2.680 
  (11.227, 2.751)  ( -6.584, 16.383)  (14.856, 4.683)  (-36.09, 30.738) 
1983-1992  13.544  2.040  5.992  -9.306 
  (19.107, 5.760)  (-8.189, 12.269)  (12.055, 2.607)  (-49.188, 30.575) 
1993-2002  4.824  7.821  9.745  -9.157 
  (13.242, 2.100)  ( -6.539, 22.180)  (18.852, 5.628)  (-50.489, 32.175) 
Limited Individual Attributes  2.061  6.288  4.840  -7.083 
  (8.439, 1.119)  (-6.906, 19.481)  (11.454, 2.551)  (-49.021, 34.856) 
No Ag, Forestry, Fishing  19.669  1.670  3.279  -7.281 
  (29.477, -13.157)  (-25.815, 29.155)  (29.505, -6.436)  (-53.776, 39.213)  
Table 8b:  Sensitivity Analysis, Value of a Statistical Life ($ millions) 
95% Confidence Interval in Parentheses 
Dependent variable: log wage 
 









Salaried Workers  3.501    5.452  9.207  47.685 
  (20.990, -0.824)   (-12.157, 23.060)  (33.464, -13.112)  (6.198, 89.173) 
Un-trimmed Sample  30.039  2.612  25.477  7.736 
  (76.427, 24.211)  (-9.027,  14.251)  (42.099, 12.077)  (-36.581, 52.052) 
Age [20,30)  6.770  1.607  6.631  -5.771 
  (10.950, 3.214)  (-6.933, 10.147)  (20.805, 2.890)  (-35.248, 23.705) 
Age [30, 40)  12.957  3.410  9.767  0.229 
  (19.599, 8.819)  ( -7.872, 14.692)  (22.001, 5.689)  (-41.364, 41.822) 
Age [40, 50)  16.510  1.577  8.363  -4.757 
  (25.318 , 8.939)  (-12.296, 15.450)  (31.725, 4.185)  (-51.146, 41.631) 
Age [50, 60)  19.629  -2.966  0.692  -8.018 
  (25.353, 11.480)  (-19.314 , 13.381)  (37.066, -4.099)  (-56.734, 40.699) 
Married  11.935  0.923  3.079  -9.337 
  (21.250, 5.677)  (-10.523, 12.369)  (19.239, 0.577)  (-52.308, 33.634) 
Unmarried  8.873  2.416  8.197  -0.224 
  (12.141, 5.058)  ( -7.035, 11.866)  (15.371, 4.827)  (-29.594, 29.147) 
1983-1992  13.219  -0.428  3.074  -5.735 
  (19.484, 5.922)  (-10.365, 9.508)  (14.057, 0.428)  (-41.116, 29.646) 
1993-2002  8.994  4.074  8.033  -4.719 
  (15.246, 4.568)  ( -7.492, 15.640)  (22.354, 5.418)  (-41.972, 32.533) 
Limited Individual Attributes  3.622  3.093  4.020  -3.259 
  (10.707, 2.212)  (-8.581, 14.766)  (13.051, 1.143)  (-41.794, 35.277) 
No Ag, Forestry, Fishing  16.638  -0.745  7.451  -3.484 
  (30.035, -15.094)  ( -28.710, 27.219)  (24.714, -10.541)  ( -45.438, 38.470)  
Table 9:  Parameter Estimates Based on Normality and Independence Assumptions 
 
Param  Est  S.E.  Param  Est  S.E.  Param  Est  S.E. 
µ1  0.04  0.01  σ1  3.52  1.12  FATAL  -3.06  0.85 
µ2  2.14  0.61  σ2  3.17  1.02  NONFATAL  -0.31  0.02 
µ3  -2.78  0.81  σ3  2.92  0.81  SCMPLX  -3.05  0.30 
µ4  -2.34  0.62  σ4  2.97  0.83  MSKILL  -0.73  0.08 
µ5  1.22  0.35  σ5  2.72  0.80  PHYDDS  2.94  0.21 
µ6  0.43  0.14  σ6  2.39  0.64  WORCON  0.18  0.05 
µ7  1.29  0.60  σ7  3.29  0.91  CSKILL  0.61  0.04 
µ8  -0.57  0.16  σ8  2.19  0.54  INTPEOPLE  2.05  0.22 
µ9  3.37  1.19  σ9  3.93  0.91       
µ10  -2.24  0.67  σ10  1.93  0.50       
µ11  0.49  0.14  σ11  2.38  0.61       
µ12  1.62  0.44  σ12  3.20  1.01       
µ13  0.99  0.30  σ13  2.88  0.77       
µ14  -2.91  0.81  σ14  3.51  0.99       
µ15  2.86  0.77  σ15  2.76  0.93       
µ16  -2.07  0.55  σ16  2.75  0.70       
µ17  -1.35  0.44  σ17  1.35  0.43       
µ18  -2.60  0.68  σ18  2.88  0.89       
µ19  -1.94  0.53  σ19  1.72  0.50       
µ20  -0.64  0.18  σ20  1.23  0.36       
µ21  0.99  0.29  σ21  3.62  1.02       
µ22  1.21  0.34  σ22  3.37  0.94       
µ23  0.58  0.15  σ23  2.34  0.66       
µ24  -1.60  0.45  σ24  2.05  0.62       
µ25  0.43  0.12  σ25  2.17  0.71       
µ26  -2.89  0.74  σ26  2.54  0.80       
µ27  -0.80  0.24  σ27  3.21  0.84       
µ28  -0.32  0.08  σ28  2.11  0.62       
µ29  2.20  0.58  σ29  2.18  0.60       
µ30  1.09  0.37  σ30  3.43  1.03       
µ31  -0.26  0.08  σ31  2.84  0.74       
µ32  0.83  0.24  σ32  1.47  0.35       
µ33  1.89  0.53  σ33  2.55  0.58       
µ34  -0.07  0.02  σ34  1.56  0.41       
µ35  0.44  0.14  σ35  4.10  1.18       
µ36  -0.23  0.07  σ36  0.81  0.26       
µ37  0.80  0.21  σ37  1.52  0.35       
µ38  3.42  0.96  σ38  3.58  0.87       
µ39  -1.05  0.33  σ39  1.97  0.61       
µ40  -1.01  0.30  σ40  2.58  0.66       
µ41  -1.59  0.42  σ41  2.18  0.49       
µ42  -3.43  1.05  σ42  3.69  1.12       
µ43  -0.03  0.01  σ43  1.83  0.51        
Figure 1 – Unconditional Wage Distributions 






Figure 2 – Conditional Wage Distributions 
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Figure 3 – Unconditional Wage Distributions 






Figure 4 – Conditional Wage Distributions 
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Figure 5 – Conditional Wage Distributions 






Figure 6 – Conditional Wage Distributions 
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